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Closing in on the Cosmos: Cosmology’s Rebirth
and the Rise of the Dark Matter Problem
Jaco de Swart
Abstract Influenced by the renaissance of general relativity that came to pass in
the 1950s, the character of cosmology fundamentally changed in the 1960s as it be-
came a well-established empirical science. Although observations went to dominate
its practice, extra-theoretical beliefs and principles reminiscent of methodological
debates in the 1950s kept playing an important tacit role in cosmological consider-
ations. Specifically, belief in cosmologies that modeled a “closed universe” based
on Machian insights remained influential. The rise of the dark matter problem in the
early 1970s serves to illustrate this hybrid methodological character of cosmological
science.
Introduction
In 1974, two landmark papers were published by independent research groups in
the U.S. and Estonia that concluded on the existence of missing mass: a yet-unseen
type of matter distributed throughout the universe whose presence could explain
several problematic astronomical observations (Einasto et al. 1974a, Ostriker et al.
1974). The publication of these papers indicates the establishment of what is cur-
rently known as the ‘dark matter’ problem – one of the most well-known anomalies
in the prevailing cosmological model. According to this model, 85% of the uni-
verse’s mass budget consists of dark matter. After four decades of multi-wavelength
astronomical observations and high-energy particle physics experiments, the nature
of this mass is yet to be determined.1
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1 For an overview of the physics, see e.g. Bertone et al. 2005; Bertone 2010; Bertone and Tait 2018.
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The origin of the dark matter problem serves more than only to illustrate the per-
sistence of this fascinating anomaly. In this paper, I argue that the early justification
for the existence of dark matter lays bare the foundation and formation of the con-
temporary discipline of cosmology. In the original 1974 papers, the two research
groups put together a series of earlier published observations and interpreted them
as signaling the presence of unseen mass. Crucially, both papers reflected on the
cosmological significance of their conclusions: the tenfold-increased mass of the
universe they had found, agreed with a decades-old cosmological model in which
the universe is ‘geometrically closed’. This model was “believed strongly” by physi-
cists “for essentially nonexperimental reasons” (Ostriker et al. 1974: L1). Dark mat-
ter mattered because it could accommodate such a model.
The establishment of dark matter’s existence is discussed in more detail in a pre-
vious paper (de Swart et al. 2017). In the current paper, I explore the significance of
the above argument. Where did this ‘closed universe’ come from, how can we un-
derstand its legitimacy, and what does it tell us about the practice of cosmology and
its history? I argue that the reasoning which helped to establish the dark matter prob-
lem is closely entangled with the maturation of the discipline of cosmology, from
the 1950s to the 1970s. Specifically, understanding the way that dark matter came to
matter reveals the development of post-war cosmology’s methodological character.
It illuminates the two faces of this character that emerged in the 1970s: a fruitful
hybrid of principle-based deductive and observational-based empirical approaches
– two faces that still show in cosmological discussions today.2
This paper builds on many authoritative works that have been written on the
history of cosmology in the second half of the twentieth century.3 These works
have particularly focused on the theoretical developments that brought about the
emergence of the big-bang cosmological paradigm in the early 1970s. The current
paper, instead, centers on studying the changes in how cosmology was practiced.
Where in the 1950s there was no unanimously celebrated theory, method or practice
that defined what a science of the universe looked like, by the early 1970s there
was an established theoretical and observational cosmological canon. I analyze this
development by tracing the continuities and discontinuities in what it meant to do
cosmology during this period.
My take on the establishment and foundations of modern cosmology centers
around understanding the rise of dark matter as an inescapable part of its history,
and as an early exemplar of its methods. I argue that dark matter’s establishment
particularly lays bare the hybrid character of modern cosmology: the dark matter
problem arises in the application of a combination of methodological strategies, in
which the roots of both ‘rationalist’ and ‘empiricist’ approaches to cosmology rever-
berate. Dark matter’s confluence of different methodological styles is traced back to
two historical developments: the wake of general relativity theory’s blooming devel-
2 Contributions to methodological discussions on inflation, string theory and the multiverse often
emphasize either empirical data or deductive thought. For this opposition see e.g. Ellis and Silk
2014.
3 For broader overviews of the history of cosmology in the second half of the twentieth century see
in particular North (1965), Kragh (1996), Smeenk (2003), Kragh (2006), and Longair (2013).
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opment in the 1950s, and the wealth of observations and institutional changes that
remade the astronomical sciences in the 1960s.
The essay then is split up in four parts, and has four different goals: (1) illustrate
the history of cosmology’s methodological foundations in the 1950s; (2) discuss
the relation between cosmology and the revival of research on general relativity in
the late 1950s; (3) indicate the fundamental conceptual and institutional changes in
the practice of astronomy during the 1960s, which signals cosmology’s ‘rebirth’;
and, (4) argue that by the 1970s, instead of a single cosmological method appearing
victorious, cosmology synthesized different scientific norms and practices, as shown
by the rise of the dark matter problem.
1 The Foundations of Cosmology in the 1950s
Partially due to the fruits of post-war observational programs in astronomy, the early
1950s knew increased attention to cosmological issues. There were new estimates
of the rate of expansion of the universe – the Hubble constant, H0 – by Baade (1952)
and Humason, Mayall and Sandage (1958); radio astronomers agreed on the extra-
galactic nature of observed radio sources (Ryle 1956); and, new catalogues of galax-
ies appeared from surveys of unprecedented size done by the Lick and Palomar ob-
servatories (Shane and Wirtanen 1954; Abell 1959). Although extra-galactic scales
started to be systematically explored (cf. Smith 2008), good and cosmologically rel-
evant observations were still considered scarce and hard to obtain. Indeed, empirical
novelties were only partially responsible for the increased attention to cosmologi-
cal research in the 1950s. A large part of the increasing work and publications on
cosmology in that period was due to a clash between two theories of the cosmos:
relativistic cosmology and the steady state theory of the universe. Due to this clash,
cosmology as a science was under severe scrutiny during the 1950s.
Relativistic cosmology was the approach rooted in Einstein’s 1917 effort to treat
the entire universe with his relativistic field equations. Although Einstein initially in-
troduced a static cosmological model, relativistic cosmology was believed to imply
an evolutionary model of the universe from the 1930s onward. This new dynamical
interpretation owed its existence to the observational work of Milton Humason and
Edwin Hubble, and theoretical developments initiated by Alexander Friedmann and
Georges Lemaıˆtre. George Gamov had connected relativistic cosmology with nu-
clear physics in the 1940s, but, by the 1950s, relativistic cosmology was still mainly
understood in terms of the Friedmann-Lemaitre picture: as a model (or set of mod-
els) in which the dynamics of Einstein’s field equations describe the expansion of
the universe. This model was the early stage of what today is understood as the big
bang theory.4
4 Note that the idea of an expanding universe did not intrinsically involve the hypothesis of a
cosmic origin, or what was known as Lemaıˆtre’s “primeval-atom” hypothesis. This idea was mainly
celebrated by Lemaıˆtre and Gamov, but it was no integral part of relativistic cosmology at that time.
Furthermore, note that the name “relativistic cosmology” is very much a convention. Some form
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Criticism of the expanding relativistic model was hardly new, but it received
a very concrete form in 1948 with the ‘steady state theory’. The theory was in-
troduced by Cambridge physicists Hermann Bondi and Thomas Gold (1948), and
mathematician Fred Hoyle (1948), as an attempt to resolve a discrepancy between
the relativistic theory and observations. This discrepancy mainly consisted of a mis-
match between the time-scales of the relativistically predicted age of the universe,
and the much larger estimated age of the Earth.5 Bondi, Gold, and Hoyle also had
serious reservations about the unphysical and unscientific nature of the idea of a cos-
mic origin, which, although not unanimously celebrated by relativists, was implied
by an expanding universe. Their alternative was a universe that on the large scale is
steady and unchanging. It was infinite of age with a constant average density. This
solved both the time-scale difficulty and the need for a big bang. The steady state
theorists notoriously hypothesized a “continuous creation of matter” to reconcile
their ideas with a constant average density in an expanding universe. These ideas
were met with skepticism by many relativists.
Steady state theorists had challenged the physical foundations of relativistic cos-
mology. The resulting debate between these parties dominated cosmological prac-
tice in the 1950s. Just as Helge Kragh (1996) has emphasized, these debates show
the fundamental philosophical character of cosmological practice in the 1950s.6 At
the same time, the explicit questioning of its foundation hints to cosmology’s pre-
paradigmatic stage as a discipline; there lacked a unanimously acclaimed theory,
method or practice that defined what a science of the cosmos looked like. I explore
these debates to particularly lay bare the methodological positions that form the
roots of current-day cosmology.
“Empiricists” and “Rationalists”
The very nature of cosmology as a proper science of the universe was at stake in the
debate between steady state theory and relativistic cosmology. How do you study
the cosmos, and what methods should guide this inquiry? Because of the severe
friction between the groups of theorists, such philosophical questions started to be
elaborately discussed in the 1950s. The different methodological positions in this
debate were often divided into two camps by the involved theorists. Steady state the-
orist Bondi wrote about “extrapolating” versus “deductive” attitudes in cosmology
(Bondi 1952: 5), whereas relativist George McVittie identified them as “empiricist”
and “rationalist” approaches (McVittie 1961a: 12). These two styles were argued
of relativity was necessarily used in all cosmologies (cf. McCrea 1953: 350). For a detailed expose´
on early relativistic cosmology, see especially Kragh (1996).
5 After the revision of the Hubble constant by Baade in 1952, the mentioned time-scale problem
became less problematic for relativistic cosmology, although it did not fully disappear. See also:
Bondi (1952), p. 140.
6 Helge Kragh has treated the details of these discussions in his 1996 book (Kragh 1996: 219-251).
Much of the tensions of the methodological debates in 1950s cosmology are rooted in early debates
from the 1930s. See e.g.: Gale and Urani (1999).
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to roughly coincide with the two theories of the cosmos: steady state theory had
a deductive approach where relativistic cosmology was based on extrapolation of
general relativity theory.7 We will see that a strict division in approaches might not
do historical justice to all theorists, but the dichotomy does highlight the prevailing
major methodological tensions.
The split between “rationalist” and “empiricist” approaches chiefly concerned
what primacy one would award to physical principles. In 1932, Edward Milne for-
mulated an extension of Einstein’s famed principle of relativity – the idea that all
frames of reference know the same laws of nature. Milne’s extended principle held
that not only the laws of nature but the universe itself must appear to have the same
structure to every observer (Milne 1932: 10). This idea has since been known as the
‘cosmological principle’. In more contemporary terms, the principle holds that the
matter distribution in the universe is homogeneous and isotropic on large scales.8
The cosmological principle quickly turned into a central element of attempts to for-
mulate theories for the structure of the universe. However, the prominence given
to the principle in building and justifying these theories differed widely.9 That is,
should the principle serve as an addendum to theoretical exploration, or does this
principle form the very condition of possibility of a science of the universe?
For Bondi and Gold, the cosmological principle explicitly served the latter goal.
In their 1948 paper, they reasoned that the cosmological principle is a logical neces-
sity for the universe to be intelligible at all, as it protects the universal applicability
of physical laws. Given that physical laws are tested locally, Bondi and Gold argued
that there is no reason to assume that they could not differ throughout the universe.
Then, in pursuing a science of the cosmos, one should provide grounds on which
it can actually be assumed that the local physical laws hold everywhere the same.
A system of cosmology should be principally concerned with this, Bondi and Gold
wrote; it should be able to justify the “unrestricted repeatability of all experiments”
(Bondi and Gold 1948: 252). For them, relativistic cosmology lacked a way to guar-
antee this unrestricted repeatability.
The steady state theorists found the grounds on which to justify the universal
application of known physical laws in what they called the “perfect cosmological
principle” (idem: 254). Their extension of the cosmological principle said that the
large-scale universe looks the same on every position in both space and time. To
avoid any dependencies of physical laws, in future and past, one should not only
assume that the universe looks the same everywhere, but also that it is unchang-
ing. Hence, as Bondi put it, one should “postulate that position in space and time is
7 Many authors used different terminology for these two styles. William McCrea, for example,
wrote about “deductive” and “astrophysical” attitudes in cosmology (McCrea 1953: 332).
8 As with many physical concepts, the exact formulation of the cosmological principle differed
between authors. Dennis Sciama formulated the cosmological principle as “[e]ach particle always
sees an isotropic distribution of particles around it” (Sciama 1960: 312). McVittie put it slightly
differently: “[t]he development of the universe appears to be the same for each observer of an
equivalent set, every one of whom assigns co-ordinates by the same method” (McVittie 1952: 96).
9 In a review of cosmology in 1953, McCrea wrote: “All the theories to be discussed require their
models to conform to the cosmological principle (CP), though we shall see that they do so for
somewhat different reasons” (McCrea 1953:326).
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irrelevant” (Bondi 1952: 11). Without the perfect cosmological principle, “cosmol-
ogy” they wrote, “is no longer a science” (Bondi and Gold 1948: 255). Because of
their primacy of a priori principles, these steady steady theorists were identified as
rationalist or deductivist.
For Hoyle’s version of the steady state theory things worked a bit differently. He
worked on a relativistic extension of Einstein’s field equations, and did not share
Bondi and Gold’s worries about the validity of physical laws. Hoyle emphasized
that formulations of these laws in terms of fields would mean that their validity
is guaranteed everywhere. In a similar fashion he disagreed about the role of the
perfect cosmological principle. He remarked in 1949: “[i]t is believed that the wide
[perfect] cosmological principle should follow as a consequence of primary axioms
of the field form [...] and should not appear itself as a primary axiom” (Hoyle 1949:
371).
Despite Hoyle’s different attitude, it seems that we can still make sense of the fact
that he was often grouped with Bondi and Gold in having a deductive approach. This
comes from the fact that Hoyle’s justification of a steady state theory in 1948 hinged
primarily upon the introduction of continuous creation of matter (Hoyle 1948). This
initial assumption was often criticized on being an “arbitrary alteration” of the field
equations (Heckmann, in Stoops 1958:76). There was no experimental evidence for
such an alteration, and hence it was argued there was no reason to abandon other fun-
damental principles (e.g. energy conservation) because of this idea. Hoyle, involved
in studies of stellar nucleosynthesis, was no less concerned with observations than
were the proponents of relativistic cosmology. His disagreement with relativistic
cosmology, however, does seem to have been considered a matter of principle.
The claim of having a deductivist or rationalist approach to cosmology was not
restricted to steady state theorists. In the 1930s, Edward Milne’s introduction of a
kinematic relativistic world model – a description of the universe without a need
for Einstein’s theory – was found to be based on a hypothetico-deductive method.
Lemaıˆtre even traced rationalist philosophical attitudes in cosmology back to Leib-
niz.10 During the 1950s, however, this approach began to be discussed program-
matically and more explicitly. This happened as steady state theorists used their
methodological convictions to defend their theory. In his 1952 textbook on cosmol-
ogy, Bondi wrote that “it is a dangerous habit of the human mind to generalize and
to extrapolate without noticing that it is doing so” (Bondi 1952: 6). Thomas Gold
more specifically warned against uncritical extrapolation of known physical laws:
“[n]o prejudices about physical principles must be used there when they would be
based merely on the acquaintance with a much smaller scale of the physical world”
(Gold 1956: 1721). In these discussions, the dichotomy of approaches to cosmology
started to take shape.
The methodology behind relativistic cosmology was less explicitly discussed;
it was formulated mainly as a response to the steady state theory. The cosmologi-
10 See: Milne (1935). In 1958 Lemaıˆtre stated: “As far as I can see, the inclination to rely on an a
priori principle is related to Leibnitz philosophical attitude which made him to believe that there
is some esthetical design in the Universe or even that the Universe is determined as being the best
possible one” (Lemaitre 1958: 2).
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cal principle was also less central in relativistic cosmology. The principle was used
as an additional criterion for obtaining special solutions of the field equations, not
as an axiomatic statement. Influential cosmologists in the 1950s advocating an ap-
proach to cosmology that opposed that of Bondi and Gold included McVittie, and
astronomer and philosopher Herbert Dingle. Especially the latter was fierce in his
response to the steady state theorists. In 1956, Dingle, former president of the Royal
Astronomical Society, wrote the following: “[s]ome cosmologists have returned to
the discredited practice of inventing arbitrary general principles, with no justifica-
tion except that they seem ‘right,’ and fitting phenomena to the requirements of the
principles” (Dingle 1956: 234).
Most relativists were similarly, but much less aggressively, in pursuit of an empir-
ical methodology. German cosmologist Engelbert Schu¨cking and astronomer Otto
Heckmann, for example, found that “[a] theory constructed on a sound foundation
of empirical data ought not to be discarded unless [...] new facts turn up that cannot
be fitted into the framework of this theory” (Schucking and Heckmann 1958: 149).
The theory to which Schu¨cking and Heckmann refer here is Einstein’s theory of
general relativity. For relativistic cosmologists, the legitimacy of Einstein’s theory
was given priority over principles. When in the mid-1950s a revival of interest and
trust in the potential of Einstein’s theory commenced, this served as an offensive
against the deductive approach.
2 Relativity’s Renaissance, Cosmology and Mach’s Principle
Although the flourishing modern era of gravitational wave astronomy and black
hole physics would seem to suggest otherwise, research on the physics of gravity
has been waxing and waning throughout the twentieth century. Whereas the subject
bloomed shortly after Einstein’s introduction of the theory of general relativity, his-
torian Jean Eisenstaedt has shown that from the mid-1920s to the 1950s gravitational
physics knew a low-water-mark period of stagnated research activity (Eisenstaedt
1986, 1987, 1989). Only in the mid-1950s did the tide turn for gravity’s relative
weight in physics research. During a period characterized by community formation
and the recognition of the general theory of relativity’s untapped physical potential,
an integrated research field of gravitational physics arose. Physicist Clifford Will
dubbed this period the “renaissance of general relativity” (Will 1986, 1989).
Research on gravity during the renaissance period knew an enormous shift to
experimental and observational issues in relativity. These issues included, for ex-
ample, the possible measurement of gravitational waves.11 With this experimental
focus, and in combination with the usage of new mathematical tools, the renais-
sance period knew a vast exploration of general relativity as the fundamental theory
of gravity. These developments during general relativity’s renaissance have been
11 See Peebles (2017) for an elaborate historical overview of the history of experimental gravita-
tional physics. For more on the history of gravitational waves during that period, see Blum et al.
(2018).
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elaborately discussed by Blum et al. (2015, 2016, 2017), and I will follow their
heuristic periodization.12 What has been discussed in lesser extent, is how general
relativity’s developments reverberated in cosmological research. The “global trans-
formation in the character of [general relativity]” that Blum et al. have addressed
(Blum et al. 2017: 98), further implied a transformation in the relationship between
cosmology and relativity. In particular, the increased authority of the general relativ-
ity theory during its renaissance emphasized a relativity-based extrapolating attitude
to cosmological research.
Steady state theorists, often trained in relativity, joined in meetings on gravita-
tional physics, and brought the discussion on how to approach cosmology to the
attention of gravity scholars. One of the most influential scholars in the new field
of gravitational physics that responded to this issue was Princeton professor John
Wheeler. During one of relativity’s renaissance famous meetings – the 1957 Chapel
Hill conference – he clearly expressed his view on how to approach cosmology. He
commented on the work of steady state theorist Thomas Gold by stating that “one
should not give up accepted ideas of wide applicability such as general relativity
but should investigate them completely” (Wheeler, in Rickles and DeWitt-Morette
1957: 129). Wheeler’s take on cosmology was the relativistic view that started to
dominate the discussions during the renaissance of general relativity: an approach
to cosmology that centered around the extrapolation of general relativity.
This view became even more ingrained as confidence in the potential of the the-
ory of general relativity kept increasing. By the early 1960s, the general opinion
was that general relativity was fundamentally true and that this needed little debate.
Venerable physicist and Princeton colleague of Wheeler, Robert Dicke, wrote that
“[specialists] take it as axiomatic that general relativity is correct in all its details
and that one must compute with this theory” (Dicke 1964: 1). That relativity was
axiomatic also held for how cosmology was perceived to be done. In 1962, Wheeler
reflected on the transformation that the status of general relativity had undergone:
Increasing numbers of investigators share the conviction that Einstein’s 1915-1916 analysis
of the curvature of space by energy is a unique theory, of unrivalled scope and reasonable-
ness, against which no objection of principle or observation has ever been sustained, and out
of which one should now try to read the deeper meaning and consequences. Among these
consequences some of the most interesting have to do with the dynamics of the universe.
(Wheeler 1962: 40)
Between about 1955 and 1963, the relation between cosmology and relativity
transformed. Where Einstein’s former research assistant Peter Bergmann wrote in
1957 that cosmology was “not intimately connected” with other aspects of relativity
(Bergmann 1957: 352), this sentiment had changed by the early 1960s. General rela-
tivity was a supplying a new “rationale” for practicing cosmology, as Wheeler put it
(Wheeler 1962: 75). The increasing confidence in the theory of relativity made cos-
mological research relevant and urgent: cosmology became the very consequence
and testing grounds for the theory of general relativity.
General relativity as a rationale for cosmology meant that, in the early 1960s,
the climate changed around the steady state versus big bang theory debate. As the
12 See also e.g. Eisenstaedt (2006), and Lalli (2017).
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steady state theory indirectly challenged general relativity through its dismissal of
relativistic cosmology, the latter began to be the more favored one. Helge Kragh sim-
ilarly reflected that relativistic cosmology’s increasing status is “probably related to
the simultaneous revival of interest in the general theory of relativity” (Kragh 1996:
318). He also pointed out that Hoyle’s, McCrea’s, and later versions of the steady
state theory were being designed to conform to the mathematics of general rela-
tivity through Einstein’s Field Equations, which again emphasizes the gravitational
theory’s increasing authority (Kragh 1999: 398).
The ‘empiricist’ approach became the dominant way to address the method of
cosmology. But how ‘empirical’ was this approach really? According to McVittie,
avid defender of relativistic cosmology, the general relativity point of view was “that
scientific cosmology should be based on the laws of physics as we know them from
experiment and observation rather than on hypotheses and principles laid down a
priori” (McVittie 1961b: 1232). However, as I hope will be clear, one could be quite
skeptical of McVittie’s remarks on the method of relativistic cosmology. That is, the
less empirical and more philosophical foundations of Einstein’s theory itself also
kept lingering within cosmology.
The Mach Connection
A sharp reader might have already been aware of the perhaps confusing identifica-
tion of relativistic cosmology as ‘empirical’ in approach. The confusion comes from
the fact that general relativity theory’s methodological underpinning is much more
elusive.13 “[T]he origins of General Relativity are mainly philosophical rather than
observational”, Robert Dicke reflected in 1961 (Dicke 1962: 4). One of these philo-
sophical foundations has been specifically recognized: the idea known as Mach’s
principle. This principle was a persistent subject in discussions on general relativity
when it accompanied the rebirth of interest in the theory during the 1950s.14 Under-
standing the role of this principle helps to understand the ambiguous methodological
character of cosmological practice, both in relativistic and steady state cosmology.
Ernst Mach’s famed principle is reminiscent of his elaborate critique on New-
ton’s absolute notions of space and motion. Opposing Newton, Mach had argued
that mechanics is not based on absolute, but on the relative position and movement
of bodies. This relationist view had far-reaching implications for Mach’s notion of
inertia. Because there is no absolute rotation, he argued that an observer on the sur-
face of a sphere should notice no physical difference in either having the sphere
rotate with respect to distant objects, or having distant objects rotate around the
sphere. However, we know that on the surface of a rotating sphere (e.g. the earth),
one experiences inertial forces like that of the centrifugal force. With Mach’s in-
13 For a comprehensive overview of the genesis of general relativity, see Renn (2007a). For an
in-depth discussion of Einstein’s methodology and its development, see van Dongen (2010).
14 Many elaborate studies have been done on Mach’s Principle, its general importance and its role
in the theory of general relativity. See specifically Barbour and Pfister (1995). The writing of a
longue dure´e history of the principle seems to have not yet been attempted.
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sights, “the principles of mechanics” could be so understood “that even for relative
rotations centrifugal forces arise” (Mach 1960: 284). Because of this reasoning,
Mach suggested there to be a relationship between local inertial forces, and the dis-
tant celestial bodies. This is what has come to be known as Mach’s principle.15
Einstein was profoundly influenced by Mach’s ideas on inertia; for a long time
he was concerned with having a theory of gravity that fully abides by Mach’s man-
date.16 As relativity revived in the 1950s, so did these concerns. The principle came
to have a wider interpretation, and more generally was understood as the idea that
the local inertial frame depends on, or, in a stronger form, is determined by the mass
distribution of the universe. In this sense, the adjective ‘Machian’ was used for any
connection between local dynamics and the structure of the universe.17 During the
renaissance of general relativity, many august physicists took Mach’s principle to be
fundamental to gravity theories. Much research was done on how to make Einstein’s
field equations come in full accord with the principle and whether one could think
of a true Machian theory of gravity.
Dennis Sciama, who is often recognized as one of the fathers of modern cos-
mology, was central in the revival of work on Mach’s principle. His doctoral work
under the supervision of Paul Dirac resulted in a novel take on the “origin of inertia”,
in which he proposed a type of long-range interaction with distant matter (Sciama
1953). Mach’s principle was put high on the list of the newly developing research
agenda of gravitational physics. Referring to Sciama’s work, Wheeler orated at the
Chapel Hill conference in 1957 that one of general relativity’s important open prob-
lems was “spelling out Mach’s principle in a better-defined way” (Wheeler 1957:
46). Robert Dicke was similarly concerned with Mach’s ideas. He wrote about its
importance on many occasions in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and was influ-
ential in discussing experiments on testing Mach’s principle through possible mass
anisotropies in the universe.18 In 1961, he and Carl Brans proposed what came to be
known the Brans-Dicke theory of gravitation, to come into accordance with Machian
ideas (Brans and Dicke 1961).
In cosmology too, Mach’s principle was of great importance during the 1950s.
It served as a foundation for both steady state and relativistic cosmology. Mach’s
principle formed a central motivation for the steady state theorists’ ‘Perfect Cos-
mological Principle’. That is, when there exists a Machian connection between the
cosmic distribution of mass and local inertia, a different mass distribution in the ear-
15 Einstein was the first who had formulated Mach’s ideas on inertia as a “principle” (Einstein
1918: 16).
16 For the role of Mach’s principle in the development of general relativity, see e.g. Hoefer (1994),
Renn (2007b), Barbour (2007), Lehmkuhl (2014), and Janssen (2014).
17 See Goenner (1970) and references therein for examples of the use of ‘Mach’s principle’ and
‘Machian’ in the 1950s and 1960s. There were many different and more technical definitions.
18 See e.g. Dicke (1959), Dicke (1962) and for experimental test also Cocconi and Salpeter (1960),
and Dicke (1961). For a historical overview of Dicke’s important work, see Peebles (2017).
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lier universe might imply different local laws of physics. The steady state theorists
tried to avoid such a possibility with their reasoning.19
Relativistic cosmology’s relation with Mach’s principle had deeper and more
complex historical ties. In Einstein’s cosmological work of 1917, he again empha-
sized that inertia should follow from a body’s gravitational interaction with all the
other masses in the universe. In any model of the universe, he hence reasoned, a
mass at sufficient distance from all the other masses should have its inertia fall
to zero. Einstein tried different ways of implementing this Machian condition. He
found it most satisfactory to use it as a selection criterion: the relativistic model that
can realize the Machian condition is the correct one. For Einstein, this model was
a universe that is spatially closed.20 Einstein later more specifically reflected on his
epistemological preference for a closed universe:
[T]his idea of Mach’s corresponds only to a finite universe, bounded in space [...]. From the
standpoint of epistemology it is more satisfying to have the mechanical properties of space
completely determined by matter, and this is the case in a closed universe. (Einstein 1922:
108)
Whether or not adding the assumption of a closed universe would make general
relativity truly Machian was, and still is, disputed.21 What cannot be disputed is
that the preference for a closed universe became wide-spread. Having a universe
that is closed was even seen as an integral part of Einstein’s theory of relativity. In
1958, Wheeler considered the following to be the meaning of the term “Einstein’s
Relativity”:
In speaking about Einstein’s theory [...] we mean not only the system of differential equa-
tions associated with his name, but also two further points, the present tentative arguments
for which he gives in his book [The Meaning of Relativity (1922)]:
(1) The universe is closed;
(2) No “cosmological” term is to be added to the field equations. (Wheeler 1958: 98)
Although by the early 1960s general relativity appeared “victorious” in cosmol-
ogy, as Kragh has put it (Kragh 1999: 398), this did not mean the empiricist approach
had swept away every a priori principle or rationalistic tendency. Given that general
relativity was a ‘theory of principle’ by its very origin, there was, on a fundamen-
tal level, no approach that can be regarded as a clear-cut winner in cosmological
19 E.g. Bondi wrote that “[f]or in any theory which contemplates a changing universe, explicit and
implicit assumptions must be made about the interactions between distant matter and local physical
laws. These assumptions are necessarily of a highly arbitrary nature, and progress on such a basis
can only be indefinite and uncertain. [...] If the uniformity of the universe is sufficiently great none
of these difficulties arise” (Bondi 1952: 12).
20 As both Chris Smeenk (2014) and Carl Hoefer (1995) have clearly spelled out, Einstein first
tried to use Mach’s statement as a boundary condition to the field equations. Later, in his 1917 cos-
mology paper, he had turned away from this perspective. Instead, he used the fact that a spatially
closed universe has no boundary region. Einstein noted: “[f]or if it were possible to regard the uni-
verse as a continuum which is finite (closed) with respect to its spatial dimensions, we should have
no need at all of any such boundary conditions” (Einstein 1987: 427). For an in-depth discussion
of Einstein’s 1917 paper, see O’Raifeartaigh et al. (2017).
21 For more information on whether general relativity is Machian see e.g. Dicke (1962), and more
generally Barbour and Pfister (1995) and references found in footnote 16.
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methodology. On the surface, general relativity was applied cosmologically in an
empiricist manner, but underneath, relativity had many ‘rationalistic’ features that
echoed through in cosmology. These features were decreasingly explicit from the
mid-1960s onward. From that moment, the efforts of relativity, astrophysics and
cosmology became dominated by newly observed phenomena.
3 The Golden Age: a Cosmological Turn
The gained trust in the theory of general relativity manifested itself in what Kip
Thorne (1994) has called a ‘golden age’ for relativity: from 1963 onward, the the-
ory became largely celebrated because of its applications to astronomy and astro-
physics. This golden age got much of its stature due to a wealth of newly observed
astronomical phenomena, and immense conceptual changes in the understanding of
the universe’s structure and contents. During this period, research on cosmology
again became re-characterized. It became less driven by relativists and was increas-
ingly integrated into the interests of astronomers and astrophysicists, which stressed
an observational research program in cosmology. I will give three examples of these
changes of interests.
Firstly, as Robert Smith (2008) has also argued, astronomy increasingly shifted
toward extra-galactic phenomena. New catalogues of galaxies based on the surveys
of the Palomar and Lick observatories in the late 1950s made it possible to better
understand the large scale distribution of galaxies.22 This included, for example, the
conclusions that clusters of galaxies were a fundamental part of this distribution.23
The advent of radio astronomy in the 1950s had similarly influenced extra-galactic
astronomy; it opened up a wavelength region that spanned more than a factor of
1000. The Cambridge C3 radio catalogues supplied astronomers with a wealth of
new data that led to the observation of unidentified phenomena in galaxies and the
universe: radio luminosities that are orders of magnitude larger than their optical
counterparts, and objects like double radio sources, radio stars, and radio galaxies.24
The great post-war sky surveys were accompanied with new instrumentation that
similarly influenced the turn to extra-galactic astronomy. In 1961, Hubble’s succes-
sor at Mt. Wilson observatory, Allan Sandage, had published an optimistic piece
on how the 200-inch Hale telescope, that first saw light in 1949, could potentially
discriminate between different cosmological models. He wrote: “[r]enewed interest
in the cosmological problem is evidenced by the number of recent papers which
22 These catalogues include Zwicky et al. (1961), Vorontsov-Vel’Yaminov and Arkhipova (1962),
and Arp (1966).
23 In 1957, George Abell wrote that “[p]rior to 1949, only a few dozen clusters were known. [...]
In recent years, however, two independent photographic programs have indicated that clusters of
galaxies are far more numerous than was formerly thought, and that indeed they may be funda-
mental condensations of matter in the universe” (Abell 1957: 3).
24 For the radio catalogues see Edge et al. (1959), and Bennett and Smith (1962). See also Sciama
(1971a), pp. 49-82.
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treat the fitting of observational data to predictions of the theory” (Sandage 1961:
356). Sandage’s analysis of possible cosmological tests and available observations
revitalized a program in observational cosmology.
The second illustration of the golden age’s conceptual changes is how relativity
became a genuine subject of concern for astronomers and astrophysicists. This was
connected to an observation that was particularly influential in making the 1960s
a golden age for general relativity: the first observation of a quasar by Maarten
Schmidt in 1963. The brightness of this radio object was 100 times larger than
any known galaxy, implying an explosive energy release. The unknown nature of
this quasar acted as a boundary problem that brought astronomy and gravitational
physics close together.
As an immediate response to the quasar discovery, the first of a very successful
series of “Texas Symposia on Relativistic Astrophysics” was held in Dallas, Texas.
Here astronomers, astrophysicists, cosmologists, gravitational physicists, and nu-
clear physicists participated to discuss the nature of these quasars. The main mo-
tivation for the symposium was indeed the energy related to the quasars: it was
calculated to be more than 1060 ergs, which is the energy contained in the rest mass
of a million solar masses (cf. Sciama (1971a): 61). The theoretical requirements
needed for an outburst of such enormous energy had “so far ruled out nearly all of
the explanations and theories put forward to explain such extraordinary events”, the
invitation to the symposium read (Robinson et al. 1965: v).
Gravitational physicists were involved in searching for a mechanism of gravita-
tional collapse that might cause such outbursts of energy. Or, as John Wheeler noted
at the Texas symposium, “attention has turned to gravitational collapse as a mecha-
nism by which in principle a fraction of the latent energy of matter much larger than
1 percent can be set free” (Harrison et al. 1965: 1). Proposed mechanisms included
the formation of objects that we now understand as black holes and neutron stars.
The conference illustrates that the quasar observation had indeed brought physicists
and astronomers very close together. At the dinner of the First Texas Symposium,
Thomas Gold, of steady state fame, made this quite clear: “[e]veryone is pleased,
the relativists [...] who are suddenly experts in a field they hardly knew existed; the
astrophysicists for having enlarged their domain, their empire, by the annexation of
another subject – general relativity” (Gold 1965: 470).
The third point that demonstrates changing concerns in the 1960s, was the in-
creasing focus on questions of origin and evolution of the universe. Quasars were
the oldest objects astronomers had observed, and because of their age, they started
to be used to track the evolution of galaxies. Their age gave insight in the early
evolutionary state of galaxies, and how galactic properties change with time. In the
1960s, the topic of galaxy evolution began to be explored. “The study of evolution of
galaxies is now in an early stage of development comparable to that of the study of
stellar evolution in 1935”, Thornton Page reflected in 1964 (Page 1964: 804). Better
knowledge of galactic evolution meant that galaxies could be used as probes for the
evolution of kinematic and gravitational properties of the universe. The evolutionary
picture of galaxies emphasized what the study of galaxies could mean for cosmol-
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ogy; the initial conditions of galaxies are closely tied to the contents and evolution
of the universe.
The above examples are far from a complete overview of the flood of phenom-
ena that entered astronomical research in the 1960s. Also included in this list are the
observation of the cosmic microwave background in 1964, and the first pulsar ob-
servation in 1967. Both these observations had an enormous theoretical impact, but
a detailed discussion of this impact would go beyond the purpose of this paper. The
given examples suffice to show how the focus of astronomers and astrophysicist was
rapidly changing in the 1960s. The flood of observations had swamped the earlier
philosophical reflections, in favor of a “renaissance in observational cosmology”, as
Dennis Sciama called it (Sciama, 1971b). Indeed, in 1970, the National Research
Council reported to U.S. Congress that “the rapid pace of discovery in astronomy
and astrophysics during the last few years has given this field an excitement unsur-
passed in any other area of the physical sciences” (National Research Council 1972:
55).
The dominance of observations in the 1960s redetermined the objects of interest
for both physicists and astronomers, and blurred the boundaries between physics
and astronomy. This is also illustrated by the manpower distribution in astronomy.
Manpower and Textbooks
The renewed interest of astronomers and physicists was accompanied by large trans-
formations in the institutional landscape of astronomy in the 1960s. Specifically,
physicists were starting to flood astronomy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By
the early 1970s, astronomy had many more, and very different practitioners com-
pared to earlier decades.
In the U.S., the 1960s knew an enormous increase in astronomy graduate stu-
dents, quite probably related to the explosive demands of the space program. The
number of degrees awarded in astronomy had increased tenfold by 1970, compared
to a decade earlier. The number of awarded astronomy degrees grew at an acceler-
ated rate: where between 1920 and 1960 the number of astronomy Ph.D.-degrees
awarded grew around 4% every year, between 1960 and 1970 this rose to a 20%
annual increase. Not only the number of students increased. The total number of
personnel employed in the field of astronomy, both technical and scientific, almost
tripled in the 1960s. 25
Besides an absolute increase in manpower, the background of people that worked
in astronomy also changed. The field became increasingly dominated by physicists.
While in 1966, 26 percent of the astronomy personnel with Ph.D.s had received their
doctorates in physics, by 1970 this had increased to 45 percent. In 1970 it was pro-
jected that it took only two more years until there were more people with Ph.D.s in
physics working in astronomy, than people with Ph.D.s in astronomy. 26 Although
25 National Research Council (1973), p. 327.
26 National Research Council (1972), pp. 55-56; National Research Council (1973), p. 332.
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the funding channels were stagnating in astronomy, the discipline was doing rela-
tively well compared to physics in the early 1970s; in 1971 the unemployment rate
of Ph.D.s in physics was more than four times as high as in astronomy.27 This could
explain part of the large influx of physicists into astronomy.
Indeed, the institutional character of astronomy had changed by the early 1970s,
and physics seemed to have taken a larger place within the discipline. At the same
time, the subject of cosmology was becoming increasingly popular. The use of “cos-
mologist” as profession began to circulate in the 1960s (Kragh 2006: 200), and
the number of publications on cosmology increased with an order of magnitude
between 1965 and 1975 (de Swart et al. 2017: 4). Furthermore, with the increas-
ing number of students, many new textbooks on cosmology appeared in the early
1970s: Jim Peebles’ “Physical Cosmology” (1971); Dennis Sciama’s “Modern Cos-
mology” (1971); Weinberg’s “Gravitation and Cosmology” (1972); Hawking and
Ellis’ “The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time” (1973); and, Thorne, Misner and
Wheeler’s “Gravitation” (1973).28 These books again show the boundary-crossing
character of cosmology: every single author of these books was a physicist by train-
ing, and many of them discuss astronomical observations, cosmological theory, and
gravitational physics.
Where the mid-1960s was dominated by the renaissance of observational cosmol-
ogy, the early 1970s, perhaps with the influence of physicists, theoretical cosmology
also flourished. Backed by radio star counts and the cosmic microwave background,
relativistic cosmology had become the canon cosmological theory, in which dif-
ferent models could be explored. There was a practical way in which theoretical
cosmology also started to flourish. Between 1967 and 1970, 32% of the astronomer
Ph.D. recipients found that their research was restricted by the lack of availability
of observing time on local and national telescopes.29 While observational capacities
were lacking, theoretical possibilities were widely available. By 1970, ‘theoretical
astrophysics’ was the research subject that enjoyed most the interest of professional
astronomers, according to the National Research Council.30
The boundary between physics and astronomy was blurring and astronomical re-
search underwent a cosmological turn: research was primed towards the study of the
universe. Cosmological research formed a hybrid environment that blended extra-
galactic astronomy, nuclear physics, astrophysics, and gravitation physics. This new
physical cosmology, as it was sometimes referred to, was accommodated by astron-
omy’s increased institutional scale and inflow of physicists. This again had conse-
quences for how cosmology was perceived to be done.
27 National Research Council (1973), p. 337. David Kaiser (2002) has in great detail written about
the case of manpower in American physics after World War II.
28 More examples of textbooks are Robertson and Noonan’s “Relativity and Cosmology” (1968),
Wolfgang Rindler’s “Essential Relativity: Special, General, and Cosmological” (1969), and Zel-
dovich and Novikov’s “Relativistic Astrophysics: Stars and Relativity” (1971).
29 National Research Council (1973), p. 349.
30 National Research Council (1972), p. 60.
16 Jaco de Swart
4 Birth and Rebirth: Cosmology and the Dark Matter Problem
By the 1970s, the status of cosmological research had radically transformed. Cos-
mology now was deeply driven by observations and had become a commonplace
subject that crossed the boundaries between physics and astronomy. Following
Merleau-Ponty and Morando (1976), it seems we can justly signify this transfor-
mation as a “Rebirth of Cosmology”.31 Quite similar to what happened in the 1950s
to general relativity – as a theory, and as a field of research – cosmology had become
a respectable part of the physical sciences.
Cosmology’s rebirth is most visible in how its status as a ‘proper’ subject of
study became undisputed. The achievements of cosmology, “especially in the last
few years”, Dennis Sciama wrote in 1971, “constitute a revolution in our knowledge
and understanding of the Universe with no parallel in the whole recorded history of
mankind” (Sciama 1971a: vii). Where, in the 1950s, renowned radio astronomer
Martin Ryle had been notoriously skeptical of the whole cosmological enterprise,32
he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1974 for his radio-astronomical work and inven-
tion of the aperture synthesis technique, that had been of “crucial significance” for
cosmology.33 It was the first time the prestigious prize was awarded for astronom-
ical research. Ryle’s student, Malcolm Longair, portrayed the shift in the status of
cosmology:
Because of the increased confidence in the hot [Big Bang] model and the larger number of
real facts about the universe, topics which in the past were questions of pure speculation
have become susceptible to detailed quantitative analyses which can be checked against the
observations. (Longair 1971:1125-1248)
The speculative days were over, and little traces were left of the great philo-
sophical discussions of the 1950s. Early textbooks like that of McVittie (1956) had
vividly discussed the nature of scientific laws, and Bondi (1952) devoted whole
sections to the cosmological principle, the problem of inertia, and the differences
between physics and cosmology. Textbooks of the early 1970s avoided such elab-
orate philosophy. Instead, the observational potential of cosmology was celebrated,
and textbooks and monographs exhibited a shift to an implicit, but familiar ‘em-
piricist’ style of reasoning. As Steven Hawking and George Ellis, both students of
Sciama, wrote in their 1973 textbook: “we shall take the local laws of physics that
have been experimentally determined, and shall see what these laws imply about the
large scale structure of the universe” (Hawking and Ellis 1973: 1).
31 Merleau-Ponty and Morando (1976) seem to use two interpretations of “The Rebirth of Cosmol-
ogy”, the title of their book: either as one of both cosmological revolutions instigated by Newton
and Einstein, or in the sense of the narrower period in which cosmology had transformed to be the
frontier of science by 1976. I use it in the latter sense.
32 In the 1950s Ryle noted “[c]osmologists always lived in a happy state of being able to postulate
theories which had no chance of being disproved [...]” (Ryle quoted in Kragh 1996: 309).
33 “Press Release: The 1974 Nobel Prize in Physics”. Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014. Web.
30 Jan 2018. For more on the curious relationship between the Nobel prize and the astronomical
sciences, see Kragh (2017).
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Another example of the overwhelming dominance of the ‘empiricist’ approach
is Dennis Sciama’s celebrated oeuvre on cosmology. While in the 1950s, Sciama
wrote a popular book that was themed around Mach’s principle – titled “The Unity
of the Universe” (Sciama, 1959) – his later book barely mentions Mach. Instead,
he emphasized that “[t]he first question must be: can [the great flood of new ob-
servations] be understood in terms of the known laws of physics?” (Sciama 1971a:
101). Mach’s principle was considered in great extent by pre-1960s textbooks, but
publications from the 1970s had mostly left these discussions aside.
The new generation of relativists and cosmologists were barely exposed to the
philosophical underpinnings of cosmology. The tendency among the new pupils in
gravitation and cosmology was clear: the phenomena came first, not the principles.
Yet the vivid methodological discussions of the 1950s did have their repercussions
in cosmological research of the 1970s. Similar to how cosmology became a hybrid
environment of astronomers and physicists, a fruitful hybrid of approaches to cos-
mology came into use. Stylistic remnants of deductive approaches can be recognized
in the a priori preferences that existed for certain cosmological models.
A Closed Universe
In the reborn science of the cosmos, there were many different models in which the
theory of the explosive universe could be realized. From the Friedmann equations
follow three different cases for the evolution of the universe. These were given by
the value of the curvature of the universe: negative (spatially open), positive (spa-
tially closed), or a special model which had no intrinsic curvature (spatially ’flat’).
This spatial curvature was indirectly measurable, and in the early 1970s there was
optimism about being able to distinguish between these models observationally.
“[B]eginning in the 1960s a flood of new discoveries has enriched our picture
of the universe and has begun to provide a basis on which to distinguish between
competing cosmological models”, Allen Sandage wrote in 1970 (Sandage 1970:
34). For him, cosmology was a “search for two numbers”: the Hubble constant,
and the deceleration parameter. The latter, in practice, was directly related to the
mass density of the universe.34 This parameter became a central research subject
in cosmology and extra-galactic astronomy. The density of the universe relates to
its destiny, and measuring it could determine which of the cosmological models
corresponds to the universe: open or closed. The density was often expressed in
terms of Ω , the density relative to the ‘critical density’: Ω = ρ/ρcritical . The critical
density (Ω = 1) was the density of a universe that was ‘flat’, which was a model
introduced by Einstein and de Sitter (1932). Less mass would mean an open universe
(Ω < 1), more mass would mean a spatially closed universe (Ω > 1).
Although Sandage, as an observer, indeed emphasized that observations will de-
termine which model is correct, preconceptions about the shape of the universe still
lingered. As discussed in Section 2, Mach’s principle had left a strong imprint on the
34 In a universe without a cosmological constant, q0 and ρ are directly related by the equation
ρ/ρc = 2q0, with ρc the critical density.
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way relativistic cosmology was done. The principle was “conceived as the require-
ment that the universe be closed”, as Wheeler had put it just before the ‘Golden
Age’ of relativity took off (Wheeler 1962: 74). Nearing the end of the 1960s, a
closed universe was still a much-preferred model for many cosmologists and rela-
tivists. “Philosophically, there might be a preference”, Wolfgang Rindler wrote in
1967, “the choice k = 1 [a positively curved universe] might appear desirable. It
implies closed space sections that would, in some sense, validate Mach’s principle
according to which the totality of matter in the universe and nothing else deter-
mines the local inertial frames” (Rindler 1967: 29-30, emphasis in original). Dennis
Sciama had a different preference, but similar reasoning for preferring a universe
with a specific density:
[...] the Einstein-de Sitter model is the one where the total energy of the universe is zero, the
kinetic energy and the negative gravitational potential energy just balancing. Well, if you
think that kinetic energy manifesting inertia is due to gravitation, then you might intuit that
the most Machian way of having one made by the other would be if there’s equal amount
of energy, which would give you uniquely the Einstein-de Sitter model, I still have a secret
hope that that might turn out so, but it may well not. (Sciama, in Weart, 1978)
The implicit preference for a closed universe was also expressed in observational
studies. “One would particularly like to know whether there is enough mass to close
the universe”, Princeton physicists Peebles and Partridge wrote in 1967, in a piece
on estimating the mass density of the universe (Peebles and Partridge 1967: 713).
However, there was a crucial discrepancy between such observations and a spatially
closed cosmological model: the measured value of the mass density of the universe
was typically around the order of 10−31 gr. cm−3, two orders of magnitude lower
than the mass needed to close the universe.35 In his 1972 textbook, Steven Weinberg
wrote:
[I]f one tentatively accepts the result that q0 is of order unity [Ω ≥ 1], then one is forced
to the conclusion that the mass density of about 2×10−29g/cm3 must be found somewhere
outside the normal galaxies. But where? (Weinberg 1972: 478)
The idea of a closed universe still found resonance with the older generation of
relativists and cosmologists, like John Wheeler (1974). But also the newer gener-
ation of cosmologists worried about the implication of this “theological” idea that
the universe ought to be closed:36
Where [can] the missing mass be hiding if it is demanded, on theological or other grounds
that Ω ≥ 1 [ρ ≥ ρc]. (Gott, J. R. et al. 1974: 550)
The discrepancy between the observed mass density and the density needed for
a closed universe made that a new problem appeared: the “problem of the so-called
‘missing mass”’, as Geoffrey Burbidge called it; the mass missing to close the uni-
verse (Burbidge 1972: 493). Such mass would ultimately vindicate Mach’s principle
35 See e.g. Oort (1958); Peebles (1971); Shapiro (1971); Noonan (1971); Weinberg (1972), p. 478;
Burbidge (1972), p. 493. The critical density is ρc = 3H
2
8piG ∼ 10−29 gr. cm−3.
36 J. Richard Gott received a Ph.D. in 1973, Jim Gunn in 1966, David Schramm in 1971, and
Beatrice Tinsley in 1966.
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that was so vigorously pursued in earlier decades, but this reason behind preferring
a closed universe did seldom enter in discussions. Although its origin was little re-
garded, the philosophical preference for extra mass did have real implications for
astrophysical and cosmological observational programs. Research was set to un-
cover potential yet-unseen intergalactic matter and to explore how to theoretically
accommodate such a finding.37 An answer to the demand for extra mass came in
1974, from two independent collaborations of astronomers and physicists.
The Birth of Dark Matter
Although cosmology had received the status of an empirical science in the early
1970s, there still lingered part of a ‘rationalist’ character in its practice. To have a
closed universe – the cosmological model initially inspired by Ernst Mach – would
mean a density much higher than was determined by observations of the luminosity
of stars and galaxies. The dark matter problem finds its birth in this context, where
two observations were recognized as indicating the existence of this ‘missing mass’.
The first of these observations concern the dynamics of galaxies. Much of the
wealth of data on galaxies that was acquired in the 1960s and early 1970s was re-
lated to radio astronomy. Radio astronomical studies of galaxies were done in great
number, with new telescopes like the Owens Valley Radio Observatory interferom-
eter and the Westerbork Radio Synthesis Telescope. With radio astronomy, galac-
tic properties could be measured much beyond a galaxy’s luminous radius. One of
these measured properties was the rotational velocity of galaxies. By the early 1970s
it was found that these rotation curves had a peculiar characteristic: the velocity of
rotation stayed “flat”, i.e. constant out to large distances where there was no mass to
account for this velocity.38
Around the same time, clusters of galaxies were found to be fundamental to
the universe’s structure, and a related anomaly that was first reported in the 1930s
regained attention. In clusters of galaxies, the masses of individual galaxies did not
add up to make sense of the observed dynamical state of the cluster. That is, the
clusters observed stability could not be explained only by the visible mass.39 Both
the flat rotation curves and the cluster discrepancy were well-known curiosities in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Only in 1974, however, these observations were
linked together and interpreted as signaling the existence of missing mass. This was
done by two independent research groups.
37 In a 1972 review, George Field wrote that “[t]he main interest in IGM [inter-galactic matter]
stems from the evidence that galactic matter constitutes only a small fraction of the critical cosmo-
logical density of matter and energy [...]” (Field 1972: 227-228).
38 For examples of these radio astronomical studies, see e.g. Roberts and Rots (1973); Rogstad
and Shostak (1972); Rogstad et al. (1973). Influential optical studies were also done by Freeman
(1970) and Rubin and Ford (1970).
39 Important overviews of the problematic dynamics of clusters include Neyman et al. (1961), Page
(1967), Rood et al. (1970) and Field and Saslaw (1971). The cluster problem was first remarked by
Fritz Zwicky (1933).
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In their 1974 article, the Princeton collaboration of astronomer Jerry Ostriker,
and physicists Jim Peebles and Amos Yahil incorporated the observations men-
tioned above into a single argument. They connected different distance scales on
which masses of galactic systems were dynamically calculated, to make an estimate
of the mass density of the universe. Their analysis showed that the observations cor-
responded to a linear increase of mass with radius. The interest of the authors to
bring these observations of galactic masses together was profoundly cosmological,
and their conclusion even more so. Their introduction read as follows:
There are reasons, increasing in number and quality, to believe that the masses of ordinary
galaxies may have been underestimated by a factor of 10 or more. [...] the current estimate
(Shapiro 1971) for the ratio of gravitational energy to kinetic energy in the universe is about
Ω = 0.01. If we increase the estimated mass of each galaxy by a factor well in excess of 10,
we increase the ratio by the same amount and conclude that observations may be consistent
with a Universe which is “just closed” (Ω = 1) – a conclusion believed strongly by some
(cf. Wheeler 1973) for essentially nonexperimental reasons. (Ostriker et al. 1974: L1)
In the establishment of the dark matter problem, the demand for extra mass acted
as a motivation to put together already existing observations and issues of mass, and
create a picture consistent with a closed universe. The paper of Wheeler to which
the authors referred, again emphasized the attractive power of a closed universe,
and “the mystery of the missing mass” that it entailed (Wheeler 1974: 686).40 As
discussed in Section 2, this belief in a closed universe was a remnant of Einstein’s
epistemological considerations concerning general relativity back in the beginning
of the twentieth century.
The argument given by Ostriker et al. shows how cosmological practice was still
embedded in the philosophical roots of cosmology and relativity. In the early 1970s,
cosmology was born anew, fed by observations and the testability of its models. But
the formation of this cosmological paradigm all but meant that a single approach
to cosmology was practiced. Dark matter, in this sense, exemplifies the hybridity of
the reborn cosmology: hybrid in the sense of its participants, being both astronomers
and physicists; hybrid in its matters of concern, ranging from scales of galaxies to
clusters; and, most illustratively, hybrid in its methodology, combining detailed ob-
servations with a priori conceptions of the cosmos. The rationale for this belief was
no longer explicitly discussed as observational programs had become dominant, but,
in practice, a closed universe kept being an influential and fruitful part of cosmolog-
ical research.
Two months before the Princeton group, a similar argument was published by
astronomer Jaan Einasto, cosmologist Ants Kaasik and Enn Saar from Tartu Obser-
vatory in Estonia in the USSR. They similarly frame their results in terms of the
critical density needed to close the universe:
Evidence is presented that galaxies are surrounded by massive coronas exceeding the
masses of known stars by one order of magnitude [...] the total density of matter in the
galaxies being 20% of the critical cosmological density. (Einasto et al. 1974b: 2)
40 Note that it was even the case that a tenfold increase in galactic masses for the authors meant
that “observations may be consistent” with a hundredfold increase in the universe mass density
(from 0.01 to 1).
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Only with these two publications in 1974, the series of observations that are now
considered evidence for dark matter were unambiguously interpreted as signaling
the existence of yet-unseen mass; observations that acquired their meaning in the
context of an age-old a priori consideration.
5 Conclusion
Between 1950 and 1970 the field of cosmology revolutionized. The cosmological
program that was initiated by Einstein in 1917 truly materialized during this post-
war period. Where in the early 1950s cosmology was dominated by meta-scientific
discussions, the field had established itself as a respectable empirical science by
1970. This rebirth of cosmology was kick-started by a renovation in physics: the
renaissance of the theory of general relativity between 1955 and 1963. The promise
of general relativity theory was rediscovered during that era and this reverberated
in its application to cosmology. General relativity’s renaissance was followed by a
period in which an overwhelming number of cosmologically relevant observations
were done, and cosmology’s ambiguous methodological foundations seemingly fell
into oblivion. By the early 1970, there was a newly established theoretical and ob-
servational cosmological canon; cosmology was born anew as a genuine physical
science.
Although they are often discussed independently from one another, I argue that
the rise of the dark matter problem in 1974 is most illustrative of cosmology’s new
paradigmatic shape. It lays bare four aspects of cosmology’s rebirth. (I) It shows
how cosmology had become a hybrid field of both physicists and astronomers: the
two landmark papers that put the dark matter problem on the map were both due
to such an interdisciplinary collaboration. (II) It demonstrates how the flood of new
astronomical observations appearing in the 1960s fed into cosmological research:
dark matter’s claim to fame was built on two observations that are reminiscent of this
decade of observational abundance. (III) Perhaps more tentatively, the rise of dark
matter illustrates how modern cosmological practice involves drawing together a
vast amount of different scales that are relevant for understanding the evolution and
structure of the universe: the dark matter problem rose from data on galactic rotation
curves and the extra-galactic dynamics of galaxy clusters. (IV) The 1974 papers
highlight that multiple methodological strategies underlie cosmological practice. In
dark matter’s case, anomalous observations were made relevant by relating them to
the potential spatial closure of the universe; a model that was preferred purely on a
priori basis.
The latter point has been central to my paper. Although in the 1970s cosmology
became a respected subject to be studied empirically, it remained richly perme-
ated with extra-theoretical considerations. A hybrid of ‘rationalist’ and ‘empiricist’
methods came to characterize cosmological practice after its mid-century rebirth. I
argue that to understand the practice of modern cosmology, we must forgo normative
claims on which approach is the correct one, and instead accept that cosmology’s
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methodology is fundamentally plural in character. Cosmology is a “methodologi-
cal omnivore”; rather than focusing on a single method or test, the field drives on
the convergence of multiple evidential means. This notion is used by philosopher
Adrian Currie to describe the historical sciences (Currie 2015), and the analysis
presented in the current paper seems a case-in-point to understand cosmology in a
similar fashion.
Cosmology’s omnivorous character again surfaces in research on contemporary
hot topics. Particularly in discussions on the merits of inflation theory, the almost di-
alectic tension between empirical and deductive strategies in cosmology resurfaces,
as is clear in a recent controversy published in Scientific American (Ijjas et al. 2017).
Similarly, non-empirical arguments are still widely used in discussions surrounding
the multiverse (cf. Kragh 2009). But also within empirical programs different ob-
servational strategies are combined: the search for dark matter recently was argued
to enter a new era “with the new guiding principle being ‘no stone left unturned”’
(Bertone and Tait 2018: 54). Perhaps this then is a lesson to draw from cosmology’s
history, and the way the dark matter problem was brought to light: scientific knowl-
edge of the universe is not acquired by a single approach, but by a hybrid of different
methods.
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